Clandestine Counter-Terror Measures

In an aggressive, yet risky, policy decision, General Petraeus has ordered a broad expansion of clandestine counter-terror measures by the military. The directive called, The Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order, signed Sept. 30, authorizes sending special operators to both friendly and hostile nations. Their stated purpose is to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes.

According to The New York Times, the goals of this approach are to build networks that could “penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy” Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to “prepare the environment” for future attacks by American or local military forces.

The order provides for small teams of American troops to fill intelligence gaps about terror organizations and other threats, especially emerging groups plotting attacks against the United States. This directive may authorize specific operations in Iran, such as gathering intelligence on its nuclear program or to identify dissident groups that might be useful for a future military offensive. Overall, however, the order appears focused on intelligence gathering — by American troops, foreign business people, academics or others — to identify militants and provide “persistent situational awareness,” while forging ties to local indigenous groups.

This policy is a double-edged sword. It reflects the Obama Administration's heavy emphasis on special operators, drones, intelligence operations and other "hearts and minds" methods in the "war on terror." As I argued in my new book: Terrorism and Public Safety Policing: Implications for the Obama Presidency, this approach has certain obvious benefits. It is designed to limit "collateral damage." It is designed to avoid angering civilian populations. While these are obviously worthwhile goals, in many circumstances it is next to impossible to distinguish between the "good guys" and the "bad guys." While ground intelligence may enhance our ability to make this distinction, the resultant military or drone attack may not be so discriminate. Indeed, radicals have families. Their families and their friends are often present in the location of the attack. They will die with the radicals. When this occurs, fellow tribal and townspeople may be angered. Hence, despite our best efforts, this dynamic is inevitable.

In addition, these methods will increase the risks to our special operators. While we have conducted special operations for many years, this new policy appears to double down on this method. This means more operations, more operators, and more risks. Using only statistical probabilities, one must come to the conclusion that it will increase our risks. This includes the substantial possibility of our soldiers being held as "spies." Can you picture the photos of these soldiers being trumpeted as "enemy combatants?" How ironic is this: As we largely abandon this legal status within our "war on terror," we will inevitably increase, likely substantially, the possibility that our soldiers will be deemed so by our enemies!

Our desire to avoid adversely impacting civilian populations will result in greater risks to our soldiers. It will also fail to prevent "collateral damage." While increasing our risks coupled with reducing adverse civilian population consequences, sounds on its face as "highly principled," the better characterization may be "politically correct."

Our desire to avoid adversely impacting civilian populations will result in greater risks to our soldiers. It will also fail to prevent "collateral damage." While increasing our risks coupled with reducing adverse civilian population consequences, sounds on its face as "highly principled," the better characterization may be "politically correct..."